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I. INTRODUCTION 
When federal agencies fail to issue regulations, respond to peti-
tions, approve plans, review standards, or take any number of actions that 
are required by statute, the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
and federal environmental laws authorize citizens to sue the agencies to 
force them to carry out their legal obligations.1 Indeed, Congress antici-
pated that citizens would play an important role in the enforcement of 
federal environmental laws.2 When faced with lawsuits for failing to per-
form non-discretionary duties, agencies tend to settle because their liabil-
ity is clear.3 
As part of such settlements, the agencies will generally agree to 
comply with their legal obligations according to a new schedule negoti-
ated with the challengers.4 Consequently, the agencies ultimately carry 
out their statutorily mandated obligations, albeit later than Congress de-
manded. Needless to say, there are those who would prefer that the agen-
cies continue to ignore their statutory obligations and abstain from issu-
ing new regulations, approving air quality control plans, listing species as 
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 1. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2012) (citizen suit provision); 
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012) (citizen suit provision); Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2012) (citizen suit provision); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 
(2006) (citizen suit provision); see also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006) (provi-
sion authorizing judicial review of final agency actions). 
 2. See infra Part IV.A. 
 3. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 4. See WILLIAM L. KOVACS, KEITH W. HOLMAN & JONATHAN A. JACKSON, U. S. CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE: REGULATING BEHIND CLOSED DOORS 30–42 (2013) [hereinafter 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE REPORT], available at https://www.uschamber.com/sites 
/default/files/legacy/reports/SUEANDSETTLEREPORT-Final.pdf. 
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endangered, or taking other actions required by law. Perhaps unsurpris-
ingly, these settlements have long been controversial. Public, private, and 
governmental interests continue to contest the proper balance and mech-
anisms by which federal agencies function and fulfill their obligations. 
Criticisms of “Sue and Settle” 
In the spring of 2013, industry groups and states began a concerted 
lobbying effort to oppose citizen enforcement of the federal environmen-
tal laws. The United States Chamber of Commerce and lobbyists for 
states created a catch-phrase—“sue and settle”—to demonize citizen en-
forcement and the federal government’s practice of settling lawsuits it is 
destined to lose in court.5 The Chamber alleged that the federal govern-
ment, by settling lawsuits brought by citizens groups rather than defend-
ing them in court, was colluding with those non-governmental organiza-
tions and excluding other affected parties to reallocate the agencies’ pri-
orities and obligations.6 
According to the Chamber, sue and settle occurs when an agency 
intentionally relinquishes its statutory discretion by accepting lawsuits 
from outside groups that effectively dictate the priorities and duties of 
the agency through legally binding, court-approved settlements negotiat-
ed behind closed doors—with no participation by other affected parties 
or the public.”7 The Chamber criticized such settlements on the grounds 
that affected parties are not involved in the settlement negotiations, do 
not have adequate notice that settlement negotiations are ongoing, and do 
not have adequate opportunities to review and comment on the settle-
ment agreements.8 
In a May 2013 report, the Chamber reviewed lawsuits that were set-
tled by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of 
Interior, and other agencies between 2009 and 2012. The report conclud-
ed that seventy-one of those lawsuits were sue and settle cases.9 With 
regard to the EPA, the Chamber alleged that the agency “chose . . . not to 
defend itself . . . at least 60 times between 2009 and 2012 [and] [i]n each 
case, it agreed to settlements on terms favorable to [special interest advo-
                                                 
 5. Id. at 3. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See id. at 5–6. 
 9. Id. at 12. The report asserted that “other agencies, including the U.S. Forest Service, the 
Bureau of Land Management, the National Park Service, the Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, and the U.S. Department of Commerce, have also agreed to this tactic.” 
Id. at 5. 
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cacy] groups.”10 The Chamber alleged that those settlements “directly 
resulted in EPA agreeing to publish more than 100 new regulations, 
many of which impose compliance costs in the tens of millions and even 
billions of dollars.”11 
The report asserted that federal agencies are settling sue and settle 
lawsuits far more frequently during the current Presidential administra-
tion than during prior administrations.12 The Chamber also criticized the 
congressional decision allowing courts to award attorney’s fees in these 
kinds of lawsuits. The authors of the Chamber report noted that attor-
ney’s fees were awarded in forty-nine of the seventy-one sue and settle 
cases, concluding that “advocacy groups are incentivized by federal 
funding to bring sue and settle lawsuits and exert direct influence over 
agency agendas.”13 
At about the same time as the Chamber released its report, the 
American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), an organization of 
state legislators,14 released a report criticizing sue and settle lawsuits on 
the grounds that the settlements frequently do not involve the participa-
tion of states that will be affected by the settlements.15 The authors of the 
report noted that the federal environmental statutes are generally en-
forced through a model of cooperative federalism, where the States have 
important rights and obligations.16 The authors complained, however, 
that “[w]ith sue and settle, the EPA has found a way to cut states out of 
the process, instead negotiating the agency’s priorities with environmen-
tal special interests.”17 Like the Chamber report, the ALEC report 
charged that the sue and settle practice has increased dramatically over 
the past few years.18 
                                                 
 10. Id. at 5. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See id. at 13–14. The report cites sixty such settlements during the Obama Administration’s 
first term (2009–2012), compared with twenty-eight (second Bush term), thirty-eight (first Bush 
term), and twenty-seven (second Clinton term) in previous administrations. 
 13. Id. at 12 n.14. 
 14. The Council is “the nation’s largest nonpartisan, individual membership organization of 
state legislators . . . [and is] committed to advancing the Jeffersonian principles of free markets, 
limited government, federalism[,] and individual liberty.” WILLIAM YEATMAN, AM. LEGISLATIVE 
EXCH. COUNCIL, THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY’S ASSAULT ON STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY iii (2013) [hereinafter ALEC, STATE SOVEREIGNTY REPORT], available at 
http://alec.org/docs/EPA_Assault_State_Sovereignty. 
 15. See id at 5–7. 
 16. Id. at 1. 
 17. Id. at 5. 
 18. Id. at 6. The report identifies forty-eight sue and settle agreements during President 
Obama’s first term, compared to eight agreements during President Bush’s second term. Id. 
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State regulators have also criticized the EPA’s litigation strategies 
on several recent occasions. In the spring of 2013, regulators from twen-
ty-one states sent a letter to the EPA, urging the agency to refrain from 
agreeing to establish power plant carbon dioxide emission limits for 
power plants in settling a suit brought by environmental groups.19 In ad-
dition, the Attorneys General of twelve states submitted a Freedom of 
Information Act request to the EPA to provide the states with “records 
concerning EPA’s practice of entering into consent decrees with non-
governmental organizations in cases concerning the implementation of 
several environmental programs”20—the agreements that critics label sue 
and settle agreements.21 When the EPA denied that request, the Attor-
neys General requested all records concerning negotiations between the 
EPA and non-governmental organizations that led to a consent decree 
regarding implementation of the Clean Air Act’s (CAA) regional haze 
program.22 When the EPA denied the request on the grounds that it was 
overbroad, the states filed a lawsuit challenging the agency’s denial,23 
asserting that the “EPA’s actions were not consistent with the coopera-
tive federalism structure of the CAA or the Regional Haze program.”24 
Congress has also taken an interest in this issue. In 2012, Repre-
sentative Ben Quayle introduced the Sunshine for Regulatory Decrees 
and Settlements Act to impose limits on settlement agreements and con-
sent decrees involving federal agencies.25 After the bill died in the 112th 
Congress, it was reintroduced in the 113th Congress as House Resolution 
1493 and Senate Bill 714.26 The proposed legislation would broaden in-
tervention in lawsuits involving federal agencies, establish cumbersome 
                                                 
 19. See Michael Bastasch, 21 States Tell EPA to Avoid ‘Sue and Settle’ Lawsuits, DAILY 
CALLER (June 19, 2013), http://dailycaller.com/2013/06/19/21-states-tell-epa-to-avoid-sue-and-settle 
-lawsuits/. 
 20. See Complaint ¶ 19, Pruitt v. EPA, No. 5:13-cv-0726 (W.D. Okla. July 16, 2013). 
 21. See Andrea Vittorio, Attorneys General Seek EPA Compliance with FOIA over ‘Sue and 
Settle’ Tactics, 44 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 2150 (July 7, 2013). 
 22. See Complaint, supra note 20, ¶ 18. 
 23. See generally id. 
 24. Id. ¶ 18. Shortly after the lawsuit was filed, the EPA’s Inspector General (IG) announced 
that the IG would investigate how the agency decides what information to release under FOIA. See 
Andrea Vittorio, Inspector General Plans to Investigate EPA on Freedom of Information Act Re-
quests, 44 ENV’T REP. (BNA) (July 26, 2013). Representatives of the EPA declined to indicate 
whether the investigation was related to the lawsuit or whether it was related to a recent report from 
the Competitive Enterprise Institute that concluded that the agency treats fee waiver requests under 
FOIA by environmental groups more favorably than requests by conservative groups. Vittorio, su-
pra. 
 25. Sunshine for Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act of 2012, H.R. 3862, 112th Cong. 
(2012). 
 26. Sunshine for Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act of 2013, H.R. 1493, 113th Cong. 
(2013); S. 714, 113th Cong. (2013). 
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settlement procedures, create a more formal notice-and-comment process 
for settlements, require agencies to provide more explanation of (and 
justification for) settlements, and change the rules for judicial supervi-
sion and review of settlements.27 
Criticism of federal agencies’ seemingly collusive settlement of 
lawsuits is not a new phenomenon. Toward the end of the last century, 
academics and grassroots environmental groups criticized “rulemaking 
settlement” by agencies.28 At that time, critics were concerned that indus-
try groups frequently sued agencies after the agencies promulgated regu-
lations, and then the parties entered into settlement agreements—without 
public participation or the participation of public interest groups—that 
led to amendment of the rules in a manner favorable to the industry 
groups.29 Critics were concerned that agencies and industry groups were 
negotiating substantive changes to rules without adequate public partici-
pation. 
In contrast to those earlier challenges, the current sue and settle crit-
ics focus primarily on settlements by agencies with environmental 
groups that change the timing of agency decision making, rather than the 
substance of the decision making.30 Although the sue and settle lawsuits 
cited by critics rarely involved the negotiation of substantive changes to 
final rules, the reforms suggested by the Chamber and Congress are 
much more severe than the reforms suggested decades ago to address 
“rulemaking settlements” between agencies and industries that addressed 
such substantive changes.31 The “cure” proposed for sue and settle law-
suits is much worse than the “disease” (if there is a disease at all). 
Federal environmental laws establish a central role for citizens in 
enforcement of the laws, and citizens will continue to sue the EPA and 
other federal agencies when the agencies fail to meet statutory deadlines 
or carry out their duties under the laws, regardless of whether Congress 
adopts the proposed reforms. The reforms will simply make settlement of 
those lawsuits much more difficult, resulting in a longer litigation pro-
cess that imposes higher costs on the government. In addition, since the 
cases are, for the most part, clear losers for the agencies, longer litigation 
will lead to higher awards of attorney’s fees. More significantly, the 
longer litigation will delay the inevitable agency action and all of its en-
                                                 
 27. Id. 
 28. See infra Part II. 
 29. See sources cited infra notes 42–60 and accompanying text. 
 30. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 30–40. 
 31. Compare sources cited infra notes 69–75 and accompanying text (outlining reform pro-
posals by Professors Jeffrey Gaba and Jim Rossi), with sources cited infra notes 96–118 and accom-
panying text (outlining reform proposals from the Chamber of Commerce and Congress). 
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vironmental and other benefits for many years. To the extent that reforms 
are necessary, much more modest proposals would suffice. This Article 
considers the features and history of rulemaking settlement controversies 
and proposes modest, sensible proposals for systemic improvement. 
Part II of this Article examines “rulemaking settlements,” including 
the criticisms of those settlements and reforms suggested by the earlier 
critics. Despite the differences in foci and constituents between current 
and past settlement controversies, examining the past issues helps to 
frame and inform any address of current issues. Part III of this Article 
identifies the concerns raised by the modern critics of sue and settle law-
suits and describes the solutions proposed by those critics and Congress. 
Part IV outlines the important role that citizen enforcement plays in envi-
ronmental laws, responds to the concerns raised by critics of sue and set-
tle lawsuits, critiques the solutions proposed by the Chamber of Com-
merce and Congress, and suggests more modest reforms. 
II. RULEMAKING SETTLEMENTS 
Toward the end of the last century, Professor Jeffrey Gaba noted 
that the promulgation of “final” rules by federal agencies through notice-
and-comment rulemaking is often “merely the first round in a larger pro-
cess in which truly final regulations may be promulgated only after the 
government and affected parties have privately negotiated their con-
tents.”32 Several years later, Professor Jim Rossi described the continuing 
trend of agencies to develop rules through negotiations to settle lawsuits, 
recognizing the potential advantages and disadvantages of the trend.33 On 
the positive side, Rossi noted that “rulemaking settlements” were con-
sistent with the trend, in administrative law, in favor of “private ordering 
over state imposed solutions” and the trend “toward flexible, consensual 
mechanisms for regulation, emphasizing less rigid, cooperative ap-
proaches over prolonged adversarial disputes.”34 
“Rulemaking settlements” can be structured as settlement agree-
ments between the litigating parties that result in the stay or ultimate 
dismissal of a lawsuit (or both) or as consent decrees negotiated by the 
parties that are then judicially enforceable.35 While Professors Rossi and 
                                                 
 32. See Jeffrey M. Gaba, Informal Rulemaking by Settlement Agreement, 73 GEO. L.J. 1241, 
1241–42 (1985). 
 33. See Jim Rossi, Bargaining in the Shadow of Administrative Procedure: The Public Interest 
in Rulemaking Settlement, 51 DUKE L.J. 1015 (2001). 
 34. Id. at 1016. Rossi pointed out the similarities between “rulemaking settlements” and nego-
tiated rulemaking. Id. 
 35. Id. at 1023; Gaba, supra note 32, at 1246–47. 
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Gaba focus most of their analysis of “rulemaking settlements” on settle-
ments of lawsuits filed to challenge final agency regulations, there are 
several contexts in which the settlements could arise. As Professor Gaba 
notes, the agreements “have fallen into one of three categories: schedul-
ing agreements, process agreements, and substantive agreements.”36 
Professor Gaba describes a “scheduling agreement” as one that 
“specifies the date by which the [agency] will promulgate a regulation 
[and is] usually negotiated in the course of litigation challenging the 
agency’s failure to issue regulations specifically required by statute.”37 
As Gaba notes, such agreements “dictate neither the content of the final 
regulations nor the steps the agency will take to develop the regula-
tions.”38 Scheduling agreements are also used to set deadlines to settle 
lawsuits brought when agencies fail to carry out other non-discretionary 
duties. Statutory-deadline suits are a major source of litigation for the 
Environmental Protection Agency, as the environmental statutes include 
hundreds of statutory deadlines.39 
In contrast to a scheduling agreement, a “process agreement” does 
not specify the content or date of an agency regulation or action, “but the 
process the agency will employ to develop the regulation.”40 The last 
type of agreement, the “substantive agreement,” involves agreement on 
the actual substance of an agency regulation or agency action.41 In most 
cases, the substantive agreement simply results in a proposed rule that 
the agency will adopt through normal notice-and-comment procedures, 
which include opportunities for public involvement in the development 
of the rule.42 
While the current controversies center on settlement agreements 
and consent decrees between federal agencies and public interest organi-
zations, rulemaking settlements have been frequently used by regulated 
entities as well. As the United States Chamber of Commerce acknowl-
                                                 
 36. Gaba, supra note 32, at 1243. 
 37. Id. at 1243. 
 38. Id. at 1244. 
 39. See William Yeatman, EPA’s Woeful Deadline Performance Raises Questions About 
Agency Competence, Climate Change Regulations, “Sue and Settle,” COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE 
INST. (July 10, 2013), http://cei.org/sites/default/files/William%20Yeatman%20-%20EPA%27s%2 
0Woeful%20Deadline%20Performance%20Raises%20Questions%20About%20Agency%20Compet
ence.pdf. In a study of rules issued between 1988 and 2003, Jacob Gersen and Anne O’Connell 
noted that the EPA was required to comply with more than 1,000 statutory deadlines during that time 
period. See Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 15 U. PA. 
L. REV. 923, 940 (2008). 
 40. See Gaba, supra note 32, at 1244. 
 41. Id. at 1245. 
 42. Id. at 1246. 
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edged in its report on sue and settle lawsuits, the “tactic” has been used 
for many years by business groups as well as public interest organiza-
tions and by both Republican and Democratic administrations.43 As Pro-
fessor Rossi points out, rulemaking settlements may frequently arise dur-
ing changes in presidential administrations because “an outgoing admin-
istration may use settlement to commit a new administration to a policy 
course, or an incoming administration may use settlement to undermine 
regulatory actions adopted by the outgoing administration.”44 
Most of the rulemaking settlements between regulated entities and 
states involve substantive agreements rather than scheduling agree-
ments.45 One of the most heavily criticized examples of this tactic by 
regulated entities or states involved the settlement, during the Bush Ad-
ministration, of litigation brought to challenge a rule adopted during the 
Clinton Administration that limited logging, mining, and road building 
on millions of acres of land in national forests (the “roadless rule”).46 
When states and industry groups sued the Forest Service, the Bush Ad-
ministration entered into agreements with the challengers to exempt mil-
lions of acres of land in Alaska from coverage under the rule and to es-
tablish a process to exempt vast amounts of acreage in other states from 
coverage under the rule.47 The Bush Administration argued that the col-
laborative process established in the settlements was preferable over con-
tinuing to defend the litigation.48 
In another case during the Bush Administration, the government 
settled a lawsuit brought by the state of Utah challenging the Department 
of Interior’s authority to adopt a policy that directed agency staff to cre-
ate inventories of lands that could be identified and protected as wilder-
ness.49 In settling the case, the government stipulated that it had no au-
thority to designate over 220 million acres of land throughout the country 
as wilderness, even though the case only involved a challenge to the des-
ignation of 2.6 million acres of land in Utah.50 
In addition to those cases, critics have condemned other “sweet-
heart deal” settlements with states and industry during the Bush Admin-
                                                 
 43. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 11–14. 
 44. See Rossi, supra note 33, at 1033. 
 45. See Patrick Parenteau, Anything Industry Wants: Environmental Policy Under Bush II, 11 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 363, 394 (2004). 
 46. Id. at 394–96; see also Martin Nie, Administrative Rulemaking and Public Lands Conflict: 
The Forest Service’s Roadless Rule, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 687, 709–10 (2004). 
 47. See Parenteau, supra note 45, at 394–96; Nie, supra note 46, at 709–10. 
 48. See Nie, supra note 46, at 711. 
 49. See Parenteau, supra note 45, at 396–98. 
 50. Id. at 397–98. 
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istration, including an agreement to eliminate a ban on the use of snow-
mobiles in Yellowstone National Park, an agreement to review the en-
dangered listing of the northern spotted owl (despite scientific evidence 
demonstrating that the population was declining), and an agreement to 
allow more logging on spotted owl reserves.51 All of those agreements 
were substantive agreements, rather than scheduling agreements. When 
an agency enters into a substantive agreement, it is generally exercising a 
greater level of discretion than when it enters into a scheduling agree-
ment, and there is a greater need for some limit on the settlement pro-
cess. 
Recent studies by Professor Wendy Wagner and Professor Cary 
Coglianese suggest that, even today, regulated entities may be able to use 
the sue and settle tactic more effectively than environmental groups to 
influence agencies to make substantive changes to final rules, as opposed 
to using the tactic to establish new deadlines in scheduling agreements.52 
Professor Wagner examined the rulemaking life cycle of ninety toxic-air 
emission standards adopted by the EPA to compare the influence of envi-
ronmental groups and industry in the pre-rulemaking, rulemaking, and 
post-rulemaking process.53 Similarly, Professor Coglianese examined a 
set of hazardous-waste rules adopted by the EPA to compare the influ-
ence of various groups in those rulemaking proceedings.54 Both Wagner 
and Coglianese determined that the post-rulemaking period presents sig-
nificant opportunities for parties to influence agencies to change their 
rules, through litigation or otherwise.55 In Wagner’s study, industry 
groups or environmental groups brought judicial challenges or filed peti-
tions for reconsideration for 22% of the toxic-air emission rules.56 Indus-
try groups brought more challenges than environmental groups for those 
rules.57 In Professor Coglianese’s study, 44% of the hazardous-waste 
rules that he examined were either challenged in court or subjected to a 
petition for reconsideration.58 While half of those cases settled, most of 
the settlements only involved regulated industry.59 In the article describ-
ing her study, Professor Wagner noted that regulated parties are likely to 
                                                 
 51. Id. at 400–01. 
 52. See Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empiri-
cal Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emissions Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99 (2011). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 108, 114, 136. 
 55. Id. at 113–15. 
 56. Id. at 134. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 136. 
 59. Id.  
900 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 37:891 
have an advantage in motivating the agencies to make changes to rules 
through litigation because regulated parties are more likely to bring chal-
lenges that lead to rule delays, compared to environmental groups who 
often bring challenges that seek to vacate rules entirely.60 
Critics have expressed concerns about agencies entering into set-
tlement agreements with environmental groups, regulated entities, or 
states when such agreements substantively change finalized rules, poli-
cies, or actions. For instance, Professor Rossi and Professor Gaba have 
both recognized that rulemaking settlements limit the participation of 
non-parties that are likely to be affected by the terms of the settlement.61 
Professor Rossi argues that when agencies’ regulations or decisions are 
challenged in court, the agencies have an incentive to settle the lawsuit 
quickly in order to implement their decision without delay and avoid 
high litigation costs.62 
Rossi notes that many persons who are affected by the agencies’ 
regulations or decisions and who may have been involved in the initial 
development of the rulemaking or decision will not be involved in the 
negotiations to settle the lawsuit. He notes further that agencies may have 
an incentive to limit affected persons’ involvement in the negotiation 
process if it would slow down the settlement of the lawsuit.63 Thus, Rossi 
recognizes that rulemaking settlements can limit the participation of per-
sons who are likely to be affected by the substantive terms of the settle-
ment.64 Further, he suggests that agencies may be willing to make con-
cessions in the negotiations that are not in the public interest and that the 
agencies might not have been willing to make if a wider array of inter-
ested persons were involved in the settlement negotiations.65 
Professor Rossi also raises concerns that the settlement negotiation 
process is not transparent and that the parties to the litigation are negoti-
ating substantive changes to agency rules or decisions “in secret.”66 Rossi 
expresses heightened concerns when the settlement to which the agency 
and litigants agree can be implemented without additional processes for 
public participation, such as notice-and-comment rulemaking.67 
Although the policies that agencies and litigants agree to when they 
enter into substantive rulemaking settlements must generally be imple-
                                                 
 60. Id. at 115. 
 61. See Rossi, supra note 33, at 1016–20; Gaba, supra note 32, at 1267–68. 
 62. See Rossi, supra note 33, at 1026. 
 63. Id. at 1027. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 1016–17. 
 66. Id. at 1029. 
 67. Id. 
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mented through subsequent notice-and-comment proceedings, Professor 
Gaba recognizes that agencies have some incentive to finalize rules in 
the subsequent notice-and-comment process in a manner consistent with 
the rules that were proposed as part of the settlement agreement. Thus, 
critics might argue that the subsequent rulemaking procedure is not pro-
cedurally adequate, since the agency may be biased in the rulemaking 
process.68 
To address some of the concerns outlined above, Professor Rossi 
suggests that it is important to provide broad notice of potential rulemak-
ing settlements.69 He argues that courts should “referee whether parties 
have been given adequate notice of a settlement,” and since he is focus-
ing primarily on settlement of lawsuits challenging rules that have been 
adopted by agencies, he argues that courts should attempt to ensure that 
persons who commented on the rule during the notice-and-comment pe-
riod are provided notice of the settlement.70 Similarly, Professor Gaba 
stresses the importance of providing notice of proposed settlements to 
non-parties who could be affected by the settlements and who are inter-
ested in the proceedings.71 
Both Professor Gaba and Professor Rossi suggest that the rules re-
garding intervention in lawsuits should be read liberally to allow non-
parties to participate in the lawsuit that gives rise to the rulemaking set-
tlement when the interests of the non-parties are not otherwise being ad-
equately represented.72 Finally, both Professor Rossi and Professor Gaba 
suggest that courts should play a more active role in reviewing the rule-
making settlements. Professor Rossi suggests that courts should engage 
in “hard look” arbitrary-and-capricious review of rulemaking settlements 
to force agencies to provide a more complete explanation of the factors 
raised in the settlement negotiations that ultimately motivated the agen-
cies to enter into the agreement.73 He recognizes, though, that there is not 
clear legal authority for that level of judicial scrutiny.74 Similarly, Pro-
fessor Gaba suggests that courts could require that agencies provide a 
written justification for the changes to rules that are proposed as part of a 
rulemaking settlement or that the settlement be published with an oppor-
tunity for non-parties to comment on the settlement.75 
                                                 
 68. See Gaba, supra note 32, at 1242, 1251–58. 
 69. See Rossi, supra note 33, at 1047–49. 
 70. Id. at 1048–49. 
 71. See Gaba, supra note 32, at 1275–76. 
 72. See id. at 1276–78; Rossi, supra note 33, at 1047. 
 73. See Rossi, supra note 33, at 1050–57. 
 74. Id. at 1056–57. 
 75. See Gaba, supra note 32, at 1278–79. 
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While Professors Gaba and Rossi raised those concerns to rulemak-
ing settlements involving substantive changes to agencies’ rules or final 
actions, both stressed that scheduling agreements raise far fewer con-
cerns.76 Nonetheless, scheduling agreements are subject to criticism, as 
explored in the next Part. 
III. THE “SUE AND SETTLE” CRITICISMS AND REFORMS 
While academics have, for several decades, criticized “rulemaking 
settlements” in lawsuits involving substantive changes to agencies’ rules 
or final actions, the recent wave of criticism of sue and settle lawsuits 
with the federal government focuses on lawsuits that are brought when a 
federal agency has not issued a regulation by a statutory deadline or has 
failed to take some other “non-discretionary” action that the law requires 
the agency to take, and the agency settles the lawsuit with a “scheduling 
agreement.” Indeed, 83% of the lawsuits that were the focus of the report 
issued by the United States Chamber of Commerce involved such chal-
lenges.77 Nevertheless, the criticisms raised by business groups and states 
are broader, and the reforms suggested are more stringent, than those 
raised by academics in the past, in the context of rulemaking agreements 
where the parties agree to substantive changes to rules or agency actions. 
A. Criticisms Raised by the United States Chamber of Commerce 
In its spring 2013 report, the United States Chamber of Commerce 
alleged that the federal government was “intentionally” relinquishing 
statutory discretion by “accepting lawsuits from outside groups that ef-
fectively dictate the priorities and duties” of the government without par-
ticipation of affected parties or the public.78 The Chamber raised con-
                                                 
 76. See id. at 1244; Rossi, supra note 33, at 1018. 
 77. The Chamber of Commerce identified seventy-one lawsuits as sue and settle cases resulting 
in new rules and agency actions in its report. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE 
REPORT, supra note 4, at 30–40. In fifty-nine of those lawsuits, the plaintiffs were suing because the 
government had failed to take some non-discretionary action. The twelve cases identified in the 
Chamber’s report that did not involve failure to take a non-discretionary action included the follow-
ing: Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, No. 06-0820 (2d Cir. 2010); Natural Res. Def. Council v. 
EPA, No. 09-60510 (5th Cir. 2010); New York v. EPA, No. 06-1322 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Sierra Club v. 
Jackson, No. 09-1041 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Sierra Club v. EPA, No. 08-1258 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Portland 
Cement Ass’n v. EPA, No. 07-10406 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Colo. Envtl. Coal. v. Salazar, No. 09-00085 
(D. Colo. 2011); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 08-03884 (N.D. Cal. 
2010); Coal River Mountain Watch v. Salazar, No. 08-02212 (D.D.C. 2010); Ctr. for Biological 
Diversity v. EPA, No. 09-00670 (W.D. Wash. 2010); WildEarth Guardians v. Kempthorne, No. 08-
00689 (D. Ariz. 2009); and Northwoods Wilderness Recovery v. Kempthorne, No. 08-01407 (N.D. 
Ill. 2009). 
 78. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 3. 
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cerns about agency capture; the improper use of congressionally appro-
priated funds; limited participation for affected parties and the public; 
and avoidance of procedural requirements of the APA and other laws or 
executive orders regarding rulemaking. 
Regarding agency capture, the Chamber alleged that when settling 
agencies enter into scheduling agreements that require the agencies to 
take actions by specific dates, the agencies are reordering their priorities 
and allocation of resources to meet the interests of the challengers and 
are limiting their discretion to set those priorities in a manner consistent 
with the public interest.79 This allegation could be grounded, in part, on a 
policy adopted by Attorney General Edwin Meese in 1986 (the “Meese 
memo”) that prohibited the federal government from entering into a con-
sent decree “that divests [a government official] of discretion” or “that 
converts into a mandatory duty the otherwise discretionary authority [of 
an official] to revise, amend[,] or promulgate regulations.”80 That policy 
was subsequently clarified and narrowed during the Clinton Administra-
tion, and it has never been interpreted to prohibit the government from 
entering into a consent decree to set a timetable for compliance with a 
non-discretionary duty after the statutory deadline for compliance has 
passed.81 
The Chamber also raised separation-of-powers concerns regarding 
the reordering of agencies’ priorities and allocation of resources in 
scheduling agreements, characterizing the settlement of such lawsuits as 
“a situation in which the [E]xecutive [B]ranch expands the authority of 
agencies at the expense of congressional oversight . . . with at least the 
implicit cooperation of the courts.”82 Similarly, the Chamber asserted 
that agencies are improperly using “congressionally appropriated funds 
to achieve the demands of private parties” when they enter into agree-
ments that have the effect of reordering the priorities.83 
Further, the Chamber alleged that agencies frequently set unrealistic 
deadlines in scheduling agreements, causing the agencies to adopt poor 
quality rules in response to the short deadlines and to divert resources 
                                                 
 79. Id. at 3, 11. The Competitive Enterprise Institute raised similar concerns in an article pub-
lished in July of 2013, examining EPA’s compliance with statutory deadlines in three Clean Air Act 
programs. See Yeatman, supra note 39. 
 80. See Memorandum from Edwin Meese III, Att’y Gen., to All Assistant Att’ys Gen. and All 
U.S. Att’ys, Department Policy Regarding Consent Decrees and Settlement Agreements 3–4 (Mar. 
13, 1986), available at http://www.archives.gov/news/samuel-alito/accession-060-89-1/Acc060-89-
1-box9-memoAyer-LSWG-1986.pdf. 
 81. See sources cited infra notes 167–70 and accompanying text. 
 82. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 6–7. 
 83. Id. at 7. 
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from other rulemakings and other actions, which results in poor quality 
or delayed decision making in those actions as well.84 
In addition to concerns about agencies’ authority to enter into 
scheduling agreements, the Chamber raised concerns that the govern-
ment does not provide adequate opportunities for persons affected by 
settlements or the public to participate in the negotiation of the terms of 
the settlement because the government does not provide adequate notice 
to all interested persons when the government has been sued or when 
someone has filed a petition for rulemaking.85 The Chamber alleged that 
the failure to provide affected parties and the public with broader oppor-
tunities to participate in the negotiation of settlement terms is anti-
democratic and will lead to poorly reasoned decisions because the affect-
ed parties will not be able to provide important information that would be 
relevant to the agency’s decision regarding the settlement terms.86 The 
American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) asserted similar con-
cerns about exclusion of states from the settlement negotiation process in 
its 2013 report.87 Because federal environmental laws frequently provide 
for a partnership between the federal government and states in adminis-
tering and enforcing various provisions of the laws, ALEC alleged that 
exclusion of states from the settlement negotiations violated principles of 
cooperative federalism that are fundamental to those laws.88 
Although there are opportunities for states, affected parties, or the 
public generally to receive notice and provide comment for some consent 
decrees and settlements, the Chamber, in its report, alleged that those 
opportunities are insufficient because agencies rarely change the terms of 
consent decrees in response to such input; thus, the opportunity to submit 
comments comes too late in the process.89 In the small number of cases 
studied where agencies enter into substantive agreements in settlements 
or consent decrees, the Chamber also asserted that agencies avoid proce-
dures required by the Administrative Procedure Act.90 Although the 
agreements generally require agencies to issue proposed rules in accord-
ance with the APA, the Chamber argued that “the outcome of the rule-
                                                 
 84. Id. at 23–24. 
 85. Id. at 5–6. The American Legislative Exchange Council raised similar concerns in its re-
port, suggesting that “[s]tates are frequently caught off guard by . . . sue and settle agreements be-
cause the EPA doesn’t inform them about the ongoing settlement negotiations.” See ALEC, STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY REPORT, supra note 14, at 6. 
 86. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 5, 23. 
 87. See ALEC, STATE SOVEREIGNTY REPORT, supra note 14, at 1, 5–6. 
 88. Id. at 1. 
 89. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 24. 
 90. Id. at 6. 
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making is essentially set,” and the public thus does not have an oppor-
tunity to comment as required by the APA.91 
Along the same lines, the Chamber alleged that when agencies 
agree to expeditious deadlines for action to resolve lawsuits based on 
their failure to meet earlier deadlines, they do not provide sufficient time 
to comply with the Regulatory Flexibility Act, the Unfunded Mandates 
Act, and various other statues and executive orders that apply to review 
of agencies’ rules.92 The Chamber also alleged that short deadlines lim-
ited the review of rules and agency actions by the Office of Management 
and Budget.93 
Finally, although the Chamber report focused primarily on cases 
that were settled by scheduling agreements and brought against the EPA 
and the Department of the Interior, the Chamber expressed concerns that 
the litigation tactic could be used more frequently to reach substantive 
agreements (instead of scheduling agreements94) and that the tactic could 
be used against other agencies based on authority in the APA.95 
B. Reforms Suggested by the United States Chamber of Commerce 
The Chamber report included several concrete recommendations for 
action to address the concerns raised in its report. In light of their con-
cerns that affected parties are not aware of ongoing lawsuits and settle-
ment negotiations, the Chamber recommended that federal agencies 
should immediately inform the public, through their website or a notice 
in the Federal Register, when they receive notice of “an advocacy 
group’s” intent to sue the agency.96 According to the Chamber, this 
would provide affected parties with a better opportunity to intervene in 
                                                 
 91. Id. at 6. In addition, the Chamber alleged that agencies cannot make many changes to rules 
after they are proposed, so it is important to involve a range of interested parties in the development 
of the proposed rule, rather than drafting the rule “to accommodate the specific demands of a single 
interest.” Id. at 25. 
 92. Id. at 23. Despite the charges, the Chamber does not cite any instances where agencies 
failed to comply with those statutory or regulatory requirements. 
 93. Id. at 23. 
 94. Id. at 22. 
 95. Id. at 7. Most of the lawsuits that the Chamber report examined were brought under the 
citizen suit provisions of various federal environmental laws, rather than the APA. The Chamber 
expressed concerns, though, that lawsuits could be brought under the APA to challenge an agency’s 
failure to issue regulations under other laws, based on a federal district court decision in California 
that adopted that approach. Id. (citing Order Re Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, Ctr. for 
Food Safety v. Hamburg, No. 4:12-cv-04529-PJH (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2012)). 
 96. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 28. 
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the cases, prepare more thoughtful comments on any proposed settle-
ments, or both.97 
Regarding intervention, the Chamber recommended that courts ap-
ply a strong presumption in favor of allowing persons to intervene in 
lawsuits.98 This presumption could be rebutted by a showing that the po-
tential intervenor’s interests are adequately represented by the existing 
parties in the action.99 Under the current rules, the intervenor has the 
burden of proving that existing parties do not adequately represent its 
interests, so the Chamber’s recommendation would turn the burden on its 
head. In addition to recommending a strong presumption in favor of in-
tervention, the Chamber recommended that judicial rules be amended to 
provide that intervenors must be given the opportunity to be involved in 
the settlement negotiations.100 
The Chamber also recommended that agencies should be required 
to submit a notice in the Federal Register when they have prepared a 
consent decree or settlement agreement and that agencies provide a rea-
sonable period for public comment, perhaps forty-five days, before filing 
the agreement or decree with the court.101 Finally, the Chamber recom-
mended more rigorous judicial oversight of the terms of settlement 
agreements and consent decrees.102 Specifically, the Chamber recom-
mended that courts “should review the statutory basis for agency actions 
in consent decrees and settlement agreements in the same manner as if 
they were adjudicating a case.”103 
C. Congressional Reform Proposals 
Representative Ben Quayle’s Sunshine for Regulatory Decrees and 
Settlements Act of 2012 was intended to impose significant procedural 
and substantive restrictions on federal agencies when they enter into con-
sent decrees or settlement agreements.104 Although that bill died in the 
112th Congress, it was reintroduced in the 113th Congress as Senate Bill 
                                                 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 29. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 28. 
 102. Id. at 29. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See Sunshine for Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act of 2012, H.R. 3862, 112th 
Cong. (2012). 
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714 and House Resolution 1493.105 Many provisions of the legislation 
are similar to the recommendations of the Chamber. 
First, the legislation provides that an agency must publish online a 
notice of intent to sue or a complaint in a case involving the agency’s 
failure to take an action required by law106 within fifteen days after re-
ceiving it.107 The legislation also establishes elaborate notice-and-
comment requirements for consent decrees and settlement agreements in 
a much wider range of cases—in any case where the decree or agreement 
requires regulatory action that affects the rights of private persons other 
than the persons suing or that affects the rights of a state, local, or tribal 
government.108 
In those cases, the legislation requires agencies to publish proposed 
consent decrees or settlement agreements in the Federal Register and 
online, along with a statement providing the statutory basis for the decree 
or agreement and a description of the terms of the decree or agreement, 
including whether it provides for attorney’s fees.109 After publishing the 
notice, the legislation requires the agency to provide a sixty-day public 
comment period and to prepare a record for the notice-and-comment pro-
cess, which includes a summary of the comments and responses and an 
index of all the documents in the record.110 The legislation prohibits 
agencies from entering a consent decree or moving to dismiss an action 
based on a settlement agreement until the agency complies with these 
notice-and-comment requirements.111 
The legislation imposes additional limits on the format of consent 
decrees and settlement agreements in cases that require regulatory action 
that affects states or private persons that are not parties. If the agreement 
or decree requires an agency to take action by a specific date (like most 
of the settlements in the Chamber report), the legislation requires the 
                                                 
 105. See Sunshine for Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act of 2013, H.R. 1493, 113th 
Cong. (2013); S. 714, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 106. The legislation defines a “covered civil action” as a civil action  
(A) seeking to compel agency action; (B) alleging that the agency is unlawfully withhold-
ing or unreasonably delaying an agency action relating to a regulatory action that would 
affect the rights of (i) private persons other than the person bringing the action; or (ii) a 
State, local, or tribal government; and (C) brought under (i) chapter 7 of title 5, United 
States Code; or (ii) any other statute authorizing such an action. 
H.R. 1493, § 2(2). 
 107. Id. § 3(a)(1). 
 108. Section 2(3) defines the scope of “covered consent decrees,” and section 2(5) defines the 
scope of “covered settlement agreements.” 
 109. Id. § 3(d)(1). 
 110. Id. § 3(d)(2). 
 111. Id. § 3(a)(2). 
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agency to inform the court of any required regulatory actions the agency 
has not taken that the decree or agreement does not address, how the de-
cree or agreement would affect the agency’s performance of those other 
required actions, and why it is in the public interest to enter into the de-
cree or agreement despite the effects on the performance of other re-
quired actions. The legislation also provides that when a settlement in-
cludes certain terms that were addressed in the 1986 Meese memo, the 
head of the agency or the Attorney General must personally sign a certi-
fication approving those terms.112 
The legislation also imposes restrictions on the settlement negotia-
tion process. First, like the Chamber’s recommendation, the legislation 
changes the rules for intervention in any lawsuit covered by the legisla-
tion and creates a rebuttable presumption that the interests of a person 
filing a motion for intervention are not adequately represented by the 
existing parties to the action.113 In addition to broadening the scope of 
parties that are likely to be involved in the litigation, the legislation sig-
nificantly changes the nature of the settlement negotiations by requiring 
that negotiations must include all intervening parties and be “conducted 
pursuant to the mediation or alternative dispute resolution program of the 
court or by a district judge other than the presiding judge, magistrate 
judge, or special master, as determined appropriate by the presiding 
judge.”114 
While the legislation does not incorporate the Chamber’s recom-
mendations regarding the standard of review that a court should apply 
when deciding whether to approve a consent decree,115 the legislation 
creates a presumption that it is proper, when the court is reviewing a pro-
                                                 
 112. Id. § 3(e). The certification is required if the agreement includes a provision that 
(i) converts into a nondiscretionary duty a discretionary authority of an agency to pro-
pose, promulgate, revise, or amend regulations; (ii) commits an agency to expend funds 
that have not been appropriated and that have not been budgeted for the regulatory action 
in question; (iii) commits an agency to seek a particular appropriation or budget authori-
zation; (iv) divests an agency of discretion committed to the agency by statute or the 
Constitution of the United States, without regard to whether the discretion was granted to 
respond to changing circumstances, to make policy or managerial choices, or to protect 
the rights of third parties; or (v) otherwise affords relief that the court could not enter un-
der its own authority upon a final judgment in the civil action. 
Id. § 3(e)(2)(A). 
 113. Id. § 3(b)(1). 
 114. Id. § 3(c). 
 115. Although it does not address the standard that a court should apply when deciding wheth-
er to initially approve a consent decree, the legislation requires courts to review consent decrees and 
settlement agreements de novo when an agency moves a court to modify a decree or agreement on 
the grounds that the terms in the settlement “are no longer fully in the public interest due to the obli-
gations of the agency to fulfill other duties or due to changed facts and circumstances.” Id. § 4. 
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posed consent decree or settlement agreement, to allow amicus participa-
tion by anyone who submitted comments on the proposed decree or 
agreement.116 
Finally, the legislation requires agencies to submit an annual report 
to Congress that identifies the number, identity, and content of lawsuits 
filed against the agency that are covered by the legislation as well as 
consent decrees or settlements entered into by the agency that are cov-
ered by the legislation.117 For each consent decree or settlement agree-
ment, the report must identify the statutory basis for the settlement and 
the basis for any award of attorney’s fees or costs in those actions.118 
IV. A RESPONSE TO THE CRITICS 
The recommendations of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the 
proposed congressional legislation would provide significant roadblocks 
to settlement of lawsuits brought against federal agencies when agencies 
fail to carry out duties required by law, but the reforms would not reduce 
the number of such lawsuits. Citizens play a vital role in enforcement of 
the federal environmental laws when the government fails to act as re-
quired by law, and the proposed reforms would simply prolong the gov-
ernment’s ultimately futile defense of those lawsuits. Many of the con-
cerns raised by the Chamber and other critics are overstated. To the ex-
tent that some of the concerns have merit, however, such concerns can be 
addressed through more moderate reforms. 
A. The Important Role of Citizen Enforcement 
Citizen suits are a “quintessentially American legal process innova-
tion.”119 Congress first authorized citizens to sue the government or other 
persons who violate environmental laws when it included a citizen suit 
provision in the Clean Air Act in 1970.120 Every major federal environ-
mental law enacted since (other than FIFRA121) includes a citizen suit 
                                                 
 116. Id. § 3(f)(1). The legislation also requires the court to ensure that the consent decree or 
settlement agreement allows for sufficient time and incorporates adequate procedures for the agency 
to comply with the APA, other statutes, or executive orders that impose requirements on rulemaking. 
Id. § 3(f)(2). 
 117. Id. § 3(g). 
 118. Id. 
 119. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, The Three Economies: An Essay in Honor of Joseph Sax, 25 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 411, 425 (1998). 
 120. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2012). 
 121. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2012). 
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provision.122 Citizen suits serve several important purposes. First, citizen 
enforcement ensures that congressional priorities are implemented when 
other factors may limit federal or state enforcement of those priorities.123 
Second, citizen enforcement promotes democratic ideals by enabling in-
terested citizens to participate meaningfully in the formulation and im-
plementation of environmental policy.124 
Regarding the primary purpose of citizen enforcement, numerous 
reports over several decades have documented chronic under-
enforcement or non-enforcement of environmental laws by federal or 
state agencies.125 As Professor Buzz Thompson notes, the balance of po-
litical power shifts toward industry in the implementation and enforce-
ment of environmental laws, as regulated entities will lobby hard against 
penalties and enforcement, and without citizen enforcement, few would 
advocate against leniency in enforcement.126 Further, he notes that be-
cause of the diffuse nature of harm caused by many environmental viola-
tions, citizens may frequently be unaware of such violations.127 In addi-
tion, when states are tasked with enforcing federal environmental laws, 
as they are under the cooperative federalism approach adopted in many 
of those laws, states have an added incentive to limit enforcement when 
they feel that aggressive enforcement might encourage businesses to re-
locate to other states that are less rigorous in their enforcement of the 
laws.128 Arguably, it is inappropriate to take those factors into account in 
determining whether to enforce environmental laws.129 
Political pressures are not the only factor that contributes to under-
enforcement or non-enforcement of environmental laws by federal and 
state agencies. Environmental agencies at the federal and state levels are 
frequently underfunded and understaffed.130 Thus, even if agencies have 
the political will to enforce the laws more aggressively, they frequently 
lack the necessary resources. When federal or state agencies lack the re-
sources or the political will to enforce the environmental laws enacted by 
Congress, citizen suit provisions allow citizens to step in and implement 
congressional will. In fact, the mere threat of citizen litigation alters the 
                                                 
 122. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Innovations in Environmental Policy: The Continuing Inno-
vation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 192. 
 123. See id. at 198. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 191. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 202–03. 
 130. Id. at 191–92. 
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political calculus for federal and state agencies and can motivate gov-
ernment enforcement.131 
Although some critics, including the Chamber of Commerce in its 
report,132 assert that citizen suits are motivated primarily by the oppor-
tunity to collect attorney’s fees, most studies conclude that citizen suits 
frequently address significant violations of environmental laws and rare-
ly address frivolous violations.133 The Chamber asserts that there has 
been no meaningful oversight of citizen suits for over forty years because 
jurisdiction rests with the congressional committee that oversees the sub-
stantive statute at issue rather than the House and Senate Judiciary 
Committees, which have expertise and jurisdiction over granting “access 
to federal courts.”134 However, that assertion exhibits the Chamber’s 
fundamental misunderstanding of the central role of citizen suits in the 
structure of the environmental statutes. To the extent that there are any 
“abuses” of the citizen suit process, the congressional committees that 
have jurisdiction over the environmental statutes are uniquely qualified 
to evaluate the implementation of the citizen suit provisions in those 
statutes. 
Even if citizen suits had not been used so effectively to address 
problems of chronic under- or non-enforcement of environmental laws, 
the provisions would still be valuable because of the democracy benefits 
noted above. Citizen suits provide interested persons with a “seat at the 
table” in environmental policymaking and provide a process for ensuring 
that their interests are represented.135 As Professor Thompson points out, 
“procedure is often as important to members of the public as out-
comes.”136 
                                                 
 131. The citizen suit provisions in environmental laws generally (1) require citizens to notify 
the defendants and the government before filing suit; (2) require citizens to wait a specific time 
period, usually sixty days after giving notice, before filing a citizen suit; and (3) prohibit citizens 
from filing a suit if the government is diligently prosecuting a civil action against a defendant for the 
violation that is the subject of their lawsuit. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012); 
Resource and Conservation Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2012); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7604 (2012). 
 132. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 12 n.14. 
 133. See Thompson, supra note 122, at 203–04. 
 134. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 8. 
 135. Thompson, supra note 122, at 210. 
 136. Id. 
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B. A Response to the Chamber’s Criticisms 
1. Agencies Are “Accepting” Lawsuits 
In its report, the Chamber asserts that agencies intentionally relin-
quish their statutory authority when they “accept” lawsuits from outside 
groups.137 The report suggests that agencies are colluding with environ-
mental groups to provide them with a preferential role in setting envi-
ronmental policy. As support for this assertion, the Chamber notes: 
[T]he coordination between outside groups and agencies is aptly il-
lustrated by a November 2010 sue and settle case where EPA and 
an outside advocacy group filed a consent decree and a joint motion 
to enter the consent decree with the court on the same day that the 
advocacy group filed its complaint against the EPA.138 
While the Chamber implies that this is evidence of collusion between the 
parties, the Chamber conveniently fails to note that the environmental 
laws require citizens to give defendants notice of intent to sue and that 
they must wait for a specific period of time, usually sixty days, before 
filing a lawsuit against the defendant.139 The notice requirement gives the 
defendant an opportunity to come into compliance and gives federal and 
state governments the opportunity to bring enforcement actions before 
the plaintiff proceeds with suit against the defendant.140 It is not at all 
surprising, therefore, that a plaintiff may negotiate a settlement with a 
defendant before filing suit, without any collusion.141 
While the Chamber tries to paint a picture of increased litigation by 
environmental groups leading to collusive settlements with the EPA, a 
recent Government Accountability Office study of environmental litiga-
tion against the EPA found “no discernible trend” in the number of law-
suits brought against the agency between 1995 and 2010.142 In fact, the 
                                                 
 137. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 3. 
 138. Id. at 11 n.12 (citing Defenders of Wildlife v. Perciasepe, No. 12-5122, slip op. at 6 (D.C. 
Cir. Apr. 23, 2013)). 
 139. See supra note 131. 
 140. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (2012); Resource and Conservation Re-
covery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b) (2012); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (2012). 
 141. At hearings on H.R. 3862 (the 2012 legislation), John Cruden, who served as Deputy 
Attorney General and other senior positions in the Environment and Natural Resources Division of 
the Department of Justice, testified, “I am not aware of any instance of a settlement, and certainly 
none I personally approved, that could remotely be described as ‘collusive.’” See H.R. REP. No. 112-
593, at 27 (2012) (dissenting views). 
 142. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-650, ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION: 
CASES AGAINST EPA AND ASSOCIATED COSTS OVER TIME 13 (2011), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11650.pdf. 
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largest category of plaintiffs suing the EPA over the study period was 
trade associations (25%), followed by private companies (23%), local 
environmental and citizens groups (16%), and national environmental 
groups (14%).143 While a change in presidential administration was iden-
tified as one factor that influences the number of lawsuits brought each 
year and the type of plaintiffs who bring them, several other factors were 
also identified as significant, including the passage of new regulations, 
amendments to laws, and EPA’s failure to meet statutory deadlines.144 
Over the fifteen-year period under study, almost 60% of the lawsuits 
brought alleged violations of the 1990 Clean Air Act.145 
The Chamber’s allegation that the agencies are “accepting” the law-
suits also implies that an agency’s decision to settle, instead of continu-
ing to defend the lawsuit, is evidence of collusion or is, at least, improp-
er. However, over 80% of the lawsuits addressed in the Chamber report 
involve challenges to an agency’s failure to meet a statutory deadline or 
take some other action required by law.146 In those cases, it is very easy 
to prove that the agency has violated the law. Courts routinely reject 
claims, like those advanced by the Food and Drug Administration in a 
case147 cited by the Chamber,148 that the agency lacks the resources to act 
by the statutorily mandated date or that it is administratively infeasible to 
act by that date.149 Indeed, the House Judiciary Report on the Sunshine 
for Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act of 2012 points out that 
“plaintiffs may have strong cases on liability in these matters, giving 
them substantial leverage over the defendant agencies.”150 Usually, there-
fore, the only issue in the litigation is the remedy for failing to act, and 
statutes that impose deadlines on agency action rarely grant explicit au-
thority to courts or agencies to modify those deadlines.151 In fashioning a 
remedy, courts will frequently rely on equitable authority to grant agen-
cies additional time to act, especially when meeting the existing dead-
lines would jeopardize the implementation of other essential programs or 
where compliance with the deadlines is impossible.152 The court may set 
                                                 
 143. Id. at 16. 
 144. Id. at 13. 
 145. Id. at 15. 
 146. See supra note 77. 
 147. See Ctr. for Food Safety v. Hamburg, No. 4:12-cv-04529-PJH (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2012). 
 148. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 7. 
 149. See Order Re Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment at 7–8, Ctr. for Food Safety v. Ham-
burg, No. 4:12-cv-04529-PJH (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2012) [hereinafter Summary Judgment Order], 
available at http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/57-sj-decision_78315.pdf. 
 150. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-593, at 4, 27 (2012). 
 151. See Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 39, at 964. 
 152. Id. at 964–65. 
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a deadline on its own, ask the agency to propose a new deadline, or simp-
ly order the agency to act expeditiously.153 
Thus, when an agency is faced with a lawsuit based on its failure to 
act in accordance with a statutory deadline, settlement is usually the most 
appropriate solution. If the agency does not enter into a settlement 
agreement, it expends additional financial and human resources defend-
ing a case that it will ultimately lose. In doing so, it increases its liability 
for attorney’s fees when the plaintiff ultimately prevails in the litiga-
tion,154 and instead of maintaining control over the new deadline in a set-
tlement, the agency faces the possibility that the court will establish a 
new deadline either unilaterally or based on the recommendations of the 
plaintiffs.155 The prolonged litigation also delays the time before the 
agency ultimately takes the act that it has failed to take, which will likely 
provide benefits to the environment, human health, or both. Through a 
settlement, therefore, the agency maintains its control over setting a new 
deadline, reduces its litigation costs and exposure to attorney’s fees, and 
protects the environment and human health more expeditiously. 
2. Agencies Are Improperly Limiting Their Discretion in Settlements 
The Chamber report criticizes federal agencies, including the EPA, 
on the ground that the agencies are improperly limiting their discretion 
by agreeing to perform statutorily required duties by specified deadlines 
in settlements and consent decrees. The criticism ignores two important 
realities. First, in most of the suits addressed in the Chamber report, the 
agencies had very little discretion to exercise, as Congress had required 
the agencies to act before the lawsuits were brought. Congress set the 
agency’s agenda and priority of resources, not the environmental chal-
lengers. Statutory deadlines shift agency resources away from programs 
                                                 
 153. Id. at 965–66. In the Center for Food Safety case cited by the Chamber in its report, the 
court ordered the parties to negotiate a deadline that was agreeable to the parties. See Summary 
Judgment Order, supra note 149, at 10. 
 154. Many of the federal environmental laws authorize courts to award litigation costs, includ-
ing attorney’s fees, to prevailing or substantially prevailing parties. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1365(d) (2012); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (2012). The Clean 
Air Act and Endangered Species Act are broader and authorize courts to award litigation costs, in-
cluding attorneys fees to any party whenever the court determines an award is appropriate. See Clean 
Air Act § 7604(d); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) (2012). 
 155. A court might impose a deadline that the agency cannot meet. See Sierra Club v. Jackson, 
No. 01-1537(PLF), 2011 WL 181097 (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2011). When the district court ordered the 
EPA to issue the regulations on a very short schedule, the agency simultaneously issued the regula-
tions, 76 Fed. Reg. 15,608 (Mar. 21, 2011), and a notice of intent to reconsider the regulations, 76 
Fed. Reg. 15,266 (Mar. 21, 2011). 
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without deadlines to programs with deadlines.156 As Professors Gersen 
and O’Connell note, “when Congress uses a [statutory] deadline, it is 
usually to constrain agency actions that have a broad effect on powerful-
ly situated political interests.”157 
Whenever agencies settle lawsuits by agreeing to new deadlines for 
action, regulated entities are receiving some benefit because the congres-
sionally required deadline has been delayed. Nevertheless, as John 
Walke, director of the Clean Air program at the Natural Resources De-
fense Council, pointed out, regulated entities would prefer that the agen-
cies not take the actions required by law at all, rather than delay them.158 
A Competitive Enterprise study found that between 1993 and 2013, the 
EPA generally promulgated regulations for three programs under the 
Clean Air Act about 2,072 days after their statutory deadlines.159 The 
Chamber and regulated entities would prefer that the EPA and other 
agencies persist in the non-enforcement of statutory obligations, rather 
than agree to expeditious timetables when they miss congressional dead-
lines. 
Second, the Chamber’s charge that agencies are improperly limiting 
their discretion also ignores the reality that when agencies enter into set-
tlement agreements and consent decrees, they are legitimately exercising 
their discretion and not improperly limiting it. As noted above, the 
Chamber’s criticism is likely based, in part, on the 1986 Meese memo, 
which prohibited the federal government from entering into a consent 
decree “that divests [a government official] of discretion” or “that con-
verts into a mandatory duty the otherwise discretionary authority [of an 
official] to revise, amend[,] or promulgate regulations.”160 The memo 
was adopted shortly after the EPA entered into a consent decree with 
several environmental groups that challenged the agency’s failure to reg-
ulate toxic water pollutants as required by the Clean Water Act.161 As 
part of the consent decree, the agency agreed to implement a much dif-
ferent regulatory program to control toxic water pollution than was re-
quired.162 Although the decree required the EPA to apply standards and 
                                                 
 156. Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 39, at 973. 
 157. Id. at 942. 
 158. See Jessica Coomes, EPA Unable to Meet Rulemaking Deadlines Required by Clean Air 
Act, Analysis Finds, 44 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 2054 (July 12, 2013). 
 159. See Yeatman, supra note 39. 
 160. See Messe memo, supra note 80, at 3. 
 161. See Natural Res. Def. Counsel v. Train, 8 E.R.C. (BNA) 2120, 2122 (D.D.C. 1976), rev’d 
in part on other grounds sub nom. Natural Res. Def. Counsel v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 
1977). 
 162. See Rossi, supra note 33, at 1033–35. 
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undertake programs that were not required by the statute, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the settle-
ment did not impermissibly interfere with the agency’s discretion.163 
Judge Wilkey, in dissent, argued that courts could not approve consent 
decrees that included conditions that courts could not impose if the case 
went to trial.164 Attorney General Meese, in his 1986 memo, agreed with 
Judge Wilkey’s dissenting opinion.165 
As Professor Robert Percival has noted, virtually every commit-
ment to take action, including an agreement to a revised schedule when 
an agency misses a statutory deadline, will involve some restraint on an 
agency’s exercise of discretion.166 However, in such cases, the agency’s 
discretion is already considerably restrained by the statute that required 
the agency’s delayed action. It is not clear, therefore, that a consent de-
cree that establishes a new timetable to replace a missed statutory dead-
line is converting a discretionary duty into a mandatory duty.167 
Notably, the Meese memo never prevented agencies from agreeing 
to modify statutory deadlines in consent decrees or to otherwise limit 
their discretion.168 In addition, the Meese memo was significantly modi-
fied more than a decade ago. In a 1999 memorandum, the Justice De-
partment concluded that the Meese memo was based on policy consid-
erations rather than legal considerations. It further declared that  
the Attorney General is free to enter into settlements that . . . limit 
the future exercise of Executive Branch discretion when that discre-
tion has been conferred upon the Executive Branch pursuant to stat-
ute and there exists no independent statutory limitation on the au-
thority of the Executive Branch to so limit the future exercise of that 
discretion.169  
The Department also concluded: 
We do not believe . . . that Article III precludes the Executive 
Branch from entering into judicially enforceable discretion limiting 
settlements as a general matter or that Article III bars federal courts 
                                                 
 163. See Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 164. Id. at 1131 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). 
 165. See Meese memo, supra note 80, at 3. 
 166. See Robert V. Percival, The Bounds of Consent: Consent Decrees, Settlements and Feder-
al Environmental Policymaking, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 327, 343. 
 167. In the parlance of the Meese memo. See id. at 342. 
 168. See Rossi, supra note 33, at 1035. 
 169. See Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal 
Counsel, to Raymond C. Fisher, Assoc. Att’y Gen., Authority of the United States to Enter Settle-
ments Limiting the Future Exercise of Executive Branch Discretion (June 15, 1999), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/consent_decrees2.htm. 
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from entering consent decrees that limit Executive Branch discre-
tion whenever such decrees purport to provide broader relief than a 
court could have awarded pursuant to an ordinary injunction.170 
It seems clear, therefore, that agencies are not improperly limiting their 
discretion when they enter into consent decrees that set new schedules to 
replace lapsed statutory deadlines. Instead, as Professor Gaba has noted, 
it is more appropriate to characterize the agency’s action as an exercise 
of discretion rather than an interference or limitation of discretion.171 
3. Settlements Violate Separation-of-Powers Principles and                      
Lead to Poor Quality Rules 
The Chamber also raised separation-of-powers concerns regarding 
agency settlements. Specifically, the Chamber argued that by agreeing to 
new deadlines to take action required by law, the Executive Branch is 
expanding the authority of agencies at the expense of congressional over-
sight.172 Similarly, it argued that agencies are improperly using congres-
sionally appropriated funds to achieve the demands of private parties 
when they enter into such agreements.173 
However, the fundamental point that the Chamber ignores in mak-
ing both of those arguments is that in these settlements, the litigants are 
forcing the agencies to act in a way that is as close to congressional in-
tent as possible—in light of the fact that the agencies have already vio-
lated that intent. To the extent that an agreement requires an agency to 
devote resources to a lapsed statutory deadline, Congress wanted those 
resources expended to meet the deadline at an earlier time and, barring 
any statutory amendment, still wants the agency to meet that deadline as 
expeditiously as possible. The agreements are implementing, rather than 
frustrating, congressional intent. If Congress no longer feels it necessary 
for agencies to meet statutory deadlines, it can eliminate or change the 
deadlines, or it can limit the agencies’ use of funds to implement those 
statutorily mandated obligations by including riders—additional provi-
sions that, despite generally being unpassable on their own and lacking in 
connection to the main subject of a bill, are added to the bill prior to pas-
sage—in appropriations legislation for the agencies. 
                                                 
 170. Id. Nevertheless, federal regulations still require assistant attorneys general to refer to the 
deputy attorney general or the associate attorney general a “proposed settlement [that] converts into 
a mandatory duty the otherwise discretionary authority of a department or agency to promulgate, 
revise, or rescind regulations.” 28 C.F.R. § 0.160 (2013). 
 171. Gaba, supra note 32, at 1262. 
 172. See source cited supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 173. See source cited supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
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The Chamber also raised concerns that agencies frequently set un-
realistic deadlines in settlements, which leads to poor quality rules and 
which diverts resources from other actions, leading to poor quality deci-
sion making with regard to those actions.174 However, the Chamber ig-
nores the fact that agencies have significant incentives to avoid entering 
into agreements that establish unrealistically short deadlines. For exam-
ple, various studies have suggested that 75% of the EPA’s major rules 
are challenged in court175 and that the challenged rules are invalidated, to 
some extent, in 30%–50% of those cases.176 Almost half of the lawsuits 
against the EPA are brought by businesses and trade organizations.177 
When an agency regulation is challenged, the agency must be able to 
defend the rule or action as reasonable, within the agency’s authority, 
and that it was adopted in accordance with the procedures required by 
law.178 The EPA and other litigation-averse agencies have strong incen-
tives to devote as much time as is necessary to decision making in order 
to make a rule or decision that will withstand judicial scrutiny. Although 
the APA only requires a minimal notice-and-comment period, it general-
ly takes the EPA many years to finalize rules after the agency publishes 
an initial notice of proposed rulemaking.179 Therefore, the EPA and other 
agencies will be reluctant to enter into settlement agreements with chal-
lengers that require the agencies to act within an unrealistically short 
time frame. 
4. Settlements Limit the Opportunities for Participation by Non-Parties 
Who Are Affected by the Settlements and by the Public 
In addition to challenges regarding the terms of settlement agree-
ments and consent decrees, the Chamber raised several concerns chal-
lenging the procedures used to negotiate and finalize those agreements. 
One of the central concerns that the Chamber raised was that non-parties 
and the public who are affected by agencies’ settlements do not have ad-
equate opportunities to participate in the negotiation and review of those 
                                                 
 174. See source cited supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 175. See Stephen M. Johnson, Ossification’s Demise: An Empirical Analysis of EPA Rulemak-
ing from 2001-2005, 38 ENVTL. L. 767, 769, 771 (2008) (finding that 75% of EPA’s economically 
significant rules finalized between 2001 and 2005 were challenged in court and citing former EPA 
administrator’s statement that 80% of EPA’s rules were challenged). 
 176. Id. at 769. 
 177. See supra text accompanying note 143. 
 178. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (judicial review standards of the APA). 
 179. See Johnson, supra note 175, at 767, 770 (finding that it took EPA an average of one and 
a half to two years to finalize the rules examined in the study and citing other studies that found that 
it took agencies an average of three to five years to finalize rules). 
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agreements.180 However, in cases where the agency is simply agreeing to 
a new deadline to replace a statutory deadline that the agency missed, the 
only harm that non-parties suffer is a lost opportunity to lobby agencies 
to further delay those actions.181 
Even in cases where agencies enter into substantive agreements, as 
opposed to scheduling agreements, the rules that the agency negotiates as 
part of the settlement agreement or consent decree generally must be 
adopted through the notice-and-comment process, so non-parties will 
have ample opportunity to participate in the decision-making process 
before the agency takes final action.182 While environmental groups may 
have greater access to agencies in developing the proposal during the 
settlement negotiations, such access could counterbalance, to some ex-
tent, the monumental imbalance that normally exists in favor of industry 
during the development of proposed rules outside of the litigation con-
text.183 
As Professor Wagner notes, since courts have limited the changes 
that agencies can make to proposed rules during the notice-and-comment 
process, agencies have a strong incentive to work closely with the regu-
lated community before issuing a proposed rule. During this period, the 
agency can gather the information necessary to develop a legally defen-
sible rule that will require minimal changes during the notice-and-
comment period.184 Most of the policymaking and true regulatory work 
occur during the rule-development stage, which is also a time when there 
are very few limits on discussions between agencies and third parties, 
and few requirements for disclosure of those contacts.185 
Professor Wagner’s study of the EPA’s development of hazardous 
air pollution regulations found that industry representatives had, on aver-
age, 170 times more communications with the EPA than public interest 
organizations during the rule-development stage and ten times more 
communications with the EPA than states during that stage.186 Further, 
she indicated that “there are several accounts of industry not only com-
                                                 
 180. See sources cited supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 181. While there may be non-parties who would advocate for shorter deadlines, the concerns 
that the Chamber raises regarding the unrealistically short deadlines that agencies enter into suggest 
that the Chamber is not concerned with the potential silencing of those voices. See supra text ac-
companying note 84. Nevertheless, non-parties whose interests are not adequately represented by the 
parties to the litigation should be able to intervene in the proceedings under normal rules of interven-
tion. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24. 
 182. See Gaba, supra note 32, at 1267–68. 
 183. See Wagner, Barnes & Peters, supra note 52, at 110–13, 124–27. 
 184. Id. at 110–11. 
 185. Id. at 112; see also Gaba, supra note 32, at 1269. 
 186. See Wagner, Barnes & Peters, supra note 52, at 124–25. 
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menting, but actually drafting the proposed rule as part of these pre-
NPRM [notice of proposed rulemaking] discussions.”187 Consequently, if 
environmental groups have some increased access to agencies when 
agencies are developing a proposed rule as part of a settlement of a law-
suit, it may simply counterbalance the advantage that industry repre-
sentatives may have already had at an earlier stage in the development of 
the rule. 
However, it is not necessary to speculate whether preferential ac-
cess for environmental groups during settlement negotiations would be 
defensible because existing procedures for intervention provide signifi-
cant opportunities for non-parties to be involved in the lawsuits brought 
by environmental groups. The Chamber asserted, however, that indus-
tries and other non-parties who may be affected by the settlement of law-
suits brought by environmental groups against agencies often lack the 
opportunity to participate in those lawsuits because they are not aware 
that the lawsuits have been filed, they have been denied opportunities to 
intervene, or they are not aware that the settlement agreements or consent 
decrees in the lawsuits are being finalized.188 
While the Chamber asserted that participation in sue and settle law-
suits is difficult because many persons affected by the lawsuits are not 
aware that the lawsuits have been filed, almost 85% of the seventy-one 
lawsuits addressed in the Chamber’s report were against the EPA, and as 
the Chamber noted in a footnote in its report, the EPA publishes all of 
the notices of intent to sue that it receives on its website.189 Of the re-
maining eleven lawsuits, all except two were filed against either the De-
partment of the Interior or one of the bureaus within the Department of 
the Interior, and they post many of the notices of intent to sue that they 
receive on their websites as well.190 
Regarding intervention, Professor Gaba raised concerns almost 
three decades ago that were similar to the Chamber’s when he suggested 
that a liberal reading of the federal rules on intervention was necessary to 
protect the interests of persons who were being excluded from agency 
settlement negotiations that developed substantive rules for notice-and-
comment rulemaking.191 However, Gaba was focusing on participation in 
                                                 
 187. Id. at 127. 
 188. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 22–25. 
 189. Id. at 6 n.6. As of December 1, 2013, sixty of seventy-one cases cited were brought 
against the EPA. See Notices of Intent to Sue the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), U.S. 
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/ogc/noi.html (last updated Feb. 3, 2014). 
 190. See, e.g., Candidate Conservation, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, http://www.fws.gov/ 
southeast/candidateconservation/esaactions.html (last updated Aug. 9, 2013). 
 191. See Gaba, supra note 32, at 1277–78. 
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litigation that leads to substantive agreements, rather than scheduling 
agreements.192 Significantly, even with regard to negotiations for sub-
stantive agreements, Gaba did not advocate for a change in the existing 
rules for intervention, but merely a liberal reading of those rules.193 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that  
[o]n timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene 
who . . . claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that 
is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposition of the 
action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s abil-
ity to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent 
that interest.194  
The burden on the movant is minimal, as the Supreme Court has held 
that the movant must merely show that the representation of her interest 
“may be” inadequate.195 Generally, though, the federal rules regarding 
intervention as a right are construed liberally, and any doubt regarding 
adequacy of representation is resolved in favor of the proposed 
intervenor.196 
Intervention is still possible even when the intervenor and existing 
parties are seeking the same ultimate result, as long as the intervenor will 
raise issues that the existing parties are unlikely to raise.197 It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that intervention was denied in only two of the seven-
ty-one cases that were included in the Chamber’s study.198 In compari-
son, more than 100 persons or entities successfully intervened in those 
seventy-one cases.199 
The American Legislative Exchange Council raised intervention 
concerns similar to those expressed by the Chamber when it alleged in a 
report that the EPA opposes the involvement of states in settlement nego-
                                                 
 192. See id. at 1241–43. 
 193. Id. at 1277–78. 
 194. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2). 
 195. See Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of Am., 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972) (emphasis 
added). 
 196. See 6 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 24.03(1)(a), (4)(a)(i) (3d 
ed. 1999) [hereinafter MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE]. 
 197. Id. ¶ 24.03(4)(a)(i). 
 198. The Chamber of Commerce identified seventy-one lawsuits as sue and settle cases result-
ing in new rules and agency actions in its report. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE 
REPORT, supra note 4, at 30–40. Of those lawsuits, the court denied a motion to intervene in only 
two cases: Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Kraft, No. 11-06059 (N.D. Cal. 2011) and Defenders of 
Wildlife v. Jackson, No. 10-01915 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 199. See Stephen M. Johnson, Intervenors in Sue and Settle Lawsuits, MERCER L., 
http://www2.law.mercer.edu/elaw/interveners.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2014). 
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tiations in sue and settle cases.200 However, the cases that ALEC cites in 
the report hardly demonstrate a pattern of EPA opposition to state in-
volvement. In the first case cited in the report, Wildearth Guardians v. 
Jackson,201 the EPA opposed the state of North Dakota’s motion to inter-
vene in the lawsuit because (1) the consent decree the State sought to 
challenge had been published in the Federal Register for comment; (2) 
the State did not submit any comments on the proposed decree; (3) the 
decree had been entered by the court several months earlier; and (4) there 
was no ongoing litigation in which to intervene.202 
In the other case cited, Fowler v. EPA, the EPA offered to provide 
the state agencies with regular briefings on settlement negotiations and 
an opportunity to voice any concerns over such negotiations, although it 
opposed an order that would require the state agencies to participate in 
the negotiations since the intervening state agencies ultimately had no 
power to veto a settlement of which they did not approve, and inclusion 
of the intervenors could delay and complicate the settlement negotia-
tions.203 The court agreed with the EPA and issued an order requiring 
regular briefings in lieu of participation by the intervenors in the settle-
ment negotiations.204 
In addition to the concerns regarding lack of notice and opportunity 
to intervene in suits, the Chamber complained that persons who would be 
most affected by settlements did not have notice or an opportunity to 
comment on proposed consent decrees or settlement agreements.205 
However, fifty of the seventy-one lawsuits (70%) addressed in the 
Chamber report were lawsuits filed under the Clean Air Act.206 The 
                                                 
 200. See ALEC, STATE SOVEREIGNTY REPORT, supra note 14, at 6–7. 
 201. No. 4:09-CV-02453-CW (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 202. See Defendant’s Opposition to North Dakota’s Motion to Intervene and Motion to Show 
Cause at 2–5, WildEarth Guardians v. Jackson, No. 4:09-CV-02453-CW (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2011). 
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um Inst. v. EPA, No. 08-1277 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Am. Lung Ass’n v. EPA, No. 12-00243 (D.D.C. 
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Cal. 2009); Comite Civico del Valle, Inc. v. Jackson, No. 10-02859 (N.D. Cal. 2010); El Comite 
Para El Bienestar De Earlimart v. EPA, No. 11-03779 (N.D. Cal. 2011); Envtl. Def. Fund v. Jack-
son, No. 11-04492 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Ky. Envtl. Found. v. Jackson, No. 10-01814 (D.D.C. 2011); Ky. 
Envtl. Found. v. Jackson, No. 11-01253 (D.D.C. 2012); La. Envtl. Action Network v. Jackson, No. 
09-01333 (D.D.C. 2010); Mossville Envtl. Action NOW v. Jackson, No. 08-01803 (D.D.C. 2009); 
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Clean Air Act includes a provision that requires the federal government 
to publish a notice in the Federal Register whenever a federal agency is 
proposing to enter into a consent decree or settlement agreement “of any 
kind” under the Act and to allow persons to submit comments on the 
agreement or decree for thirty days before the government can file the 
agreement or decree with a court.207 Thus, in almost three-fourths of the 
cases in the Chamber’s study, the EPA provided notice and an opportuni-
ty for comment on the decree or agreement pursuant to an existing statu-
tory obligation. The Superfund law and the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA)—the federal hazardous waste law—also include 
provisions that require the EPA to provide notice and an opportunity for 
comment before finalizing consent decrees or settlement agreements in 
certain situations.208 Further, the Environment and Natural Resources 
Division of the Department of Justice, which represents the EPA, the 
Department of Interior, and most federal agencies in litigation, posts pro-
posed consent decrees on its website as well as in the Federal Register.209 
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 207. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(g) (2012). 
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tlements); 42 U.S.C. § 6973(d) (RCRA—comment period for settlements involving imminent haz-
ards). 
 209. See Proposed Consent Decrees, U.S. DEP’T JUST., ENV’T & NAT. RESOURCES DIVISION, 
http://www.justice.gov/enrd/Consent_Decrees.html (last updated March 2014). 
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5. Settlements Allow Agencies to Avoid Procedures Required                        
by the APA and Other Laws, and Executive Orders That                       
Govern Agency Rulemaking 
Although most of the lawsuits in the Chamber’s study were settled 
through scheduling agreements rather than substantive agreements, the 
Chamber alleged that federal agencies were avoiding procedures required 
by the APA in the small set of cases that were resolved through substan-
tive agreements.210 However, in most settlement agreements, the federal 
government merely agrees to adopt a particular approach as a proposed 
rule, which is subject to all of the notice-and-comment requirements of 
the APA.211 Indeed, when an agency attempts to avoid the notice and 
comment requirements of the APA by adopting substantive policies 
through a consent decree or settlement agreement, courts will invalidate 
the agreement or decree, as the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did in 
Conservation Northwest v. Sherman,212 which the Chamber cited in its 
report.213 
When the EPA or any other agency enters into a substantive agree-
ment with challengers and issues a notice of proposed rulemaking to im-
plement that agreement, any interested persons can participate in the 
rulemaking process, regardless of whether they were involved in the liti-
gation that led to the proposed rulemaking. Moreover, any person who is 
dissatisfied with the final rule adopted by the agency through that pro-
cess can sue the agency in accordance with the APA or other statutory 
authority. In fact, numerous studies have found that in the normal notice-
and-comment rulemaking process, industry representatives play a signif-
icantly greater role than environmental groups, which the Chamber as-
serts is unfairly influencing the development of rules.214 In Professor 
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Wagner’s study of the EPA’s hazardous air pollution regulations, she 
found that industry representatives participated in the notice-and-
comment process for all ninety of the standards, while public interest 
organizations participated in the process for fewer than half of the stand-
ards.215 Further, she found that 81% of the comments submitted during 
the rulemaking process came from industry representatives, compared to 
4% submitted by public-interest organizations.216 
The Chamber alleged that opportunities for participation in the no-
tice-and-comment process after agencies settle lawsuits with substantive 
agreements is a sham because the agencies have a strong incentive to 
finalize the proposed rules without significant changes so that the under-
lying lawsuit will be dismissed.217 Professors Gaba and Rossi raised 
similar concerns regarding rulemaking settlements in other contexts.218 
However, Professor Gaba stressed that even if an agency may have 
an incentive to finalize the rule in the same form as proposed, this subtle 
bias would not violate the APA because it does not require an impartial 
decision maker in the development of rules.219 Similarly, since procedur-
al due process limits normally do not apply to rulemaking, due process 
would not prohibit any subtle bias in the agency toward finalizing the 
rule as proposed.220 However, the normal requirements of the APA, in-
cluding the standards of review, would apply to the agency’s decision. 
Thus, the agency would have to justify its decision as reasonable in light 
of the comments that it received (and in light of all of the information 
before the agency).221 Further, because the APA requires agencies to 
provide a concise general statement of the basis and purpose of final 
rules, the agency would not be able to ignore important issues or factors 
raised by commenters during the notice-and-comment process.222 
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In addition to these reasons, in light of the significant advantage in-
dustry groups possess in the notice-and-comment rulemaking process 
and in the normal pre-rule development process,223 the Chamber’s claim 
that sue and settle lawsuits avoid the procedural protections of the APA 
lacks merit. 
The Chamber also asserted that the consent decrees and settlement 
agreements provided insufficient time for agencies to comply with the 
regulatory review requirements of the Office of Management and Budg-
et, the Regulatory Flexibility Act, the Unfunded Mandates Act, and sev-
eral executive orders.224 However, the Chamber did not cite any specific 
instance in which agencies did not comply with those laws or require-
ments. 
C. Shortcomings of Proposed Policy Recommendations 
Although the Sunshine for Regulatory Decrees and Settlement Acts 
of 2012225 and 2013226 were introduced prior to the Chamber’s report, 
they include provisions that target many of the concerns raised in the 
report. Even if the concerns raised by the Chamber were weightier than 
they are, the proposed legislation is much more restrictive than neces-
sary. 
1. Intervention Reforms 
The proposed legislation shifts the burden of proof regarding inter-
vention by creating a rebuttable presumption that the interests of a person 
seeking intervention are not adequately represented by the existing par-
ties to the litigation. However, as noted above, the rules regarding inter-
vention are already quite lenient, and as Professor Peter Appel has noted, 
courts have additional incentives, due to rules of appellate procedure, to 
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grant motions to intervene without any change in the existing rules.227 
Specifically, Professor Appel writes: 
[I]f a district court denies intervention, the dissatisfied applicant can 
appeal immediately. If a district court grants intervention, however, 
no party can appeal that order until final judgment. Thus, the district 
court faced with a motion for intervention has two choices. The 
court can deny the motion and face the substantial possibility of an 
appeal, which could later disrupt the proceedings if the court of ap-
peals reverses. On the other hand, the court can grant the motion 
and simply bear the additional aggravation of having the intervenor 
participate without the possibility of immediate appellate review 
and a greatly reduced chance that the appellate court will even re-
view the intervention decision.228 
Furthermore, even without changes to the rules on intervention, Profes-
sor Appel points out that in many cases, the parties to a lawsuit have in-
centives to allow non-parties to intervene in their litigation.229 He notes 
that allowing non-parties to intervene could increase the likelihood that 
they will accept the solution agreed upon in the settlement and decrease 
the likelihood that they will challenge the implementation of that deci-
sion.230 This would seem to be a significant incentive for the EPA, in 
light of the frequency of challenges to the rules it adopts.231 
Conversely, Professor Appel argues that broad intervention rules 
impose significant costs on courts and litigants. Broad intervention rules 
complicate and delay litigation and can significantly increase financial 
and resource costs, as the parties must respond to additional arguments, 
demands for discovery, and witnesses from the intervenors. Further, the 
court must listen to and evaluate the claims of additional parties and 
manage the sprawling litigation.232 Professor Appel also notes that “often 
additional voices can drown out the effective presentation of argu-
ment.”233 Moreover, he argues that the existing intervention rules have 
reached far beyond their intended audience and that the historical pur-
pose of the rules was to protect the rights of persons that had “such a 
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pronounced interest in the litigation that litigating that interest away 
would probably present due process problems.”234 
Writing several years earlier, Professor Percival suggested that in-
tervention rules were adequate to protect the interests of regulated enti-
ties concerned about agencies settling lawsuits that might affect them.235 
Professor Percival pointed out that rules on intervention and notice may 
be inadequate to protect the interests of some poorly organized groups— 
especially those lacking significant financial resource—but that they ad-
equately protected most regulated entities.236 He also noted that even if 
poorly organized groups had more notice and opportunities to become 
involved, they would still lack the organization and resources necessary 
to effectively participate in the development of the settlement agree-
ments.237 Even if the current legislation were focused on protecting the 
interests of those non-parties—which it is not—the legislation provides 
no support to those groups to facilitate meaningful participation in the 
settlement process. Professor Appel raised similar concerns when he 
suggested that the goals of supporters of broad intervention rules for pub-
lic law litigation could be met by the appointment of guardians ad litem, 
special masters, or experts, rather than intervenors, to protect the inter-
ests of the public or non-parties that might be affected by the settlement 
of the litigation.238 
Since the existing rules do not seem to impose significant road-
blocks to intervention (if the Chamber’s study is any indication), and 
since broader rules could impose significant costs on courts and litigants, 
it is unnecessary to expand the intervention rules as the proposed legisla-
tion would require. The proposed legislation requires that settlement ne-
gotiations must include all intervening parties and, more importantly, 
that the negotiations must be conducted pursuant to a mediation or alter-
native dispute resolution program, or by a judge, magistrate judge, or 
master appointed by the presiding judge.239 While mediation and alterna-
tive dispute resolution are valuable tools when used in appropriate cir-
cumstances, it is not necessary to subject settlement negotiations to that 
degree of formality in every case. In many cases, requiring the parties to 
engage in mediation would needlessly divert time and resources from the 
settlement process. The additional procedural limitations on settlement 
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negotiations in the proposed legislation would more likely obstruct and 
delay those negotiations than facilitate them. 
2. Notice Reforms 
The proposed legislation also establishes elaborate notice-and-
comment requirements for consent decrees and settlement agreements in 
a wide range of cases brought against federal agencies.240 First, the legis-
lation requires agencies to publish proposed consent decrees or settle-
ment agreements in the Federal Register and online, along with a state-
ment providing the statutory basis for the decree or agreement and a de-
scription of the terms of the decree or agreement, including whether it 
provides for attorney’s fees.241 After publishing the notice, the legislation 
requires the agency to provide a sixty-day public comment period and 
prepare a record for the notice-and-comment process that includes a 
summary of the comments and responses, and an index of all of the doc-
uments in the record.242 Since notice-and-comment rulemaking is the 
paradigm of notice-and-comment proceedings in administrative law, it is 
useful to compare the proposed legislative requirements to the APA’s 
requirements for notice-and-comment rulemaking.243 
Significantly, the proposed sixty-day comment period is twice as 
long as the comment period required by the APA for notice-and-
comment rulemaking.244 Similarly, the procedures that the proposed leg-
islation imposes on agencies regarding their duty to document and re-
spond to comments are far more onerous than those imposed by the 
APA. The APA does not require agencies to prepare official records of 
notice-and-comment rulemaking proceedings245 and does not explicitly 
require agencies to prepare a summary of the comments and responses in 
the proceedings.246 The timing of the comment period in the proposed 
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legislation is also twice as long as the comment periods required for con-
sent decrees and settlement agreements by the Clean Air Act247 and the 
Superfund law,248 and neither of these laws impose such detailed re-
sponse and recording requirements on the agency to respond to com-
ments and prepare an official record of the notice-and-comment pro-
cess.249 Like other provisions of the proposed legislation, these provi-
sions seem to be designed to delay and obstruct settlement, rather than to 
increase transparency in the process. 
Second, in addition to the comment and record-keeping require-
ments discussed above, the proposed legislation provides that if an 
agreement or decree requires an agency to take action by a specific date, 
the agency must inform the court of any required regulatory actions the 
agency has not taken that the settlement does not address, how the decree 
or agreement would affect the agency’s performance of those other re-
quired actions, and why it is in the public interest to enter into the decree 
or agreement despite the effects on the performance of other required 
actions.250 This reporting requirement is both broad and amorphous. 
First, it requires the agency to identify all actions that the agency is re-
quired to take under any law by a specific date, regardless of whether the 
settlement or decree would have any effect on the performance of those 
duties.251 One could imagine that this requirement would be rather cum-
bersome for an agency like the EPA, which is required to take hundreds 
of actions by statutory deadlines.252 Second, at the time of the settlement 
agreement or decree, it may be unclear what precise effect, if any, com-
pliance with the new deadline in the settlement will have on performance 
                                                                                                             
Carolina v. Block, 717 F.2d 874, 886 (4th Cir. 1983) (“There is no obligation to make references in 
the agency explanation to all the specific issues raised in comments.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 247. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(g) (2012) (30 day comment period). 
 248. See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(2), (i) (2012) (thirty-day comment period). The proposal is also 
fifteen days longer than the time period suggested by the Chamber of Commerce. See CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 28. 
 249. The Clean Air Act does not specify a procedure that the EPA must follow in reviewing 
comments, but provides generally that “[t]he Administrator or the Attorney General, as appropriate, 
shall promptly consider any such written comments and may withdraw or withhold his consent to the 
proposed order or agreement if the comments disclose facts or considerations which indicate that 
such consent is inappropriate, improper, inadequate, or inconsistent with the requirements of this 
chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 7413(g) (2012). The notice-and-comment provisions of Superfund are struc-
tured in a similar manner. See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(2), (i). 
 250. See H.R. 1493, 113th Cong. § 3(d)(4) (2013). 
 251. Id. 
 252. The Competitive Enterprise Institute study referenced earlier in this article indicated that 
EPA is currently subject to 322 statutory deadlines for just three programs in the Clean Air Act. See 
Yeatman, supra note 39. Similarly, the Gersen study referenced earlier in this Article noted that the 
EPA was required to comply with over 1,000 statutory deadlines between 1988 and 2003. See 
Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 39, at 940. 
2014] Sue and Settle: Demonizing the Environmental Citizen Suit 931 
of the hundreds of other statutory obligations of the agency. Neverthe-
less, the agency is required to speculate on what those effects might be 
and argue, based on those speculative effects, that the agreement or de-
cree is in the public interest.253 
It is unusual to require courts to supervise the discretionary alloca-
tion of scarce resources in this manner. Indeed, when the Food and Drug 
Administration refused, in response to petitions from prisoners sentenced 
to death by lethal injection, to bring enforcement actions under the Food 
and Drug Act to prevent the use of the lethal injection drugs, the Su-
preme Court, in a landmark decision, held that the agency’s decision 
could not be reviewed under the APA because it was committed to agen-
cy discretion by law.254 In justifying its decision, the Court wrote: 
[A]n agency decision not to enforce often involves a complicated 
balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its ex-
pertise. Thus, the agency must not only assess whether a violation 
has occurred, but whether agency resources are best spent on this 
violation or another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if it 
acts, whether the particular enforcement action requested best fits 
the agency’s overall policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has 
enough resources to undertake the action at all. An agency generally 
cannot act against each technical violation of the statute it is 
charged with enforcing. The agency is far better equipped than the 
courts to deal with the many variables involved in the proper order-
ing of its priorities.255 
Just as the Supreme Court recognized that an agency is in the best posi-
tion to determine the optimal allocation of limited resources when it has 
the discretion to bring enforcement actions, Congress should not require 
courts to review and second-guess an agency’s decisions regarding allo-
cation of scarce resources when the agency agrees to a new deadline in a 
settlement agreement to replace a lapsed statutory deadline. 
3. Judicial Review Reforms 
Congress and the Chamber of Commerce have also proposed 
changes to the judicial role in the review and approval of consent decrees 
and settlement agreements. The proposed legislation would require 
courts to review consent decrees and settlement agreements to ensure 
that any deadlines included provide sufficient time for agencies to com-
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ply with the APA and with rulemaking requirements in other laws and 
executive orders.256 Although this is not a burdensome requirement, there 
is no evidence that prior settlement agreements were deficient in that re-
gard.257 In addition, while not burdensome, the requirement is not cost-
less. 
Any expansion of the judicial review of consent decrees and settle-
ment agreements will impose costs on the parties to gather and provide 
information to the court so it can evaluate compliance with new require-
ments, and it will impose costs on the court to evaluate that infor-
mation.258 If courts are more likely to reject settlements based on new 
requirements or under expanded review authority, parties will need to 
engage in additional rounds of settlement negotiations to develop settle-
ments that will either meet the new requirements or withstand the new 
review.259 Further, if parties cannot predict whether courts will approve 
their settlements under expanded review procedures, parties may be less 
likely to settle.260 
The Chamber of Commerce recommends a more fundamental 
change in judicial oversight than Congress has proposed, and argues that 
courts “should review the statutory basis for agency actions in consent 
decrees and settlement agreements in the same manner as if they were 
adjudicating a case.”261 As an initial premise, it should be noted that ab-
sent legislative intervention, a plaintiff and defendant are ordinarily free 
to settle their litigation without judicial approval.262 However, in many 
cases, the parties may seek to invest the court with enforcement authority 
over their agreement by entering a consent decree, or in some cases, leg-
islation may require judicial oversight of agreements.263 Generally, when 
courts review consent decrees, they evaluate whether the decree is in the 
public interest and whether it was reached through good-faith bargain-
ing.264 Although the decree must resolve a matter within the court’s ju-
risdiction, the Supreme Court has held that a court is not barred from 
entering a consent decree “merely because it might lack authority . . . to 
                                                 
 256. See H.R. 1493, § 3(f)(2). 
 257. See source cited supra note 224 and accompanying text. 
 258. See Sanford I. Weisburst, Judicial Review of Settlements and Consent Decrees: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 59 (1999). 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 29. 
 262. See Weisburst, supra note 258, at 55. 
 263. Id. at 56. 
 264. See Joel S. Jacobs, Compromising NEPA?: The Interplay Between Settlement Agreements 
and the National Environmental Policy Act, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 113, 117 (1995); Percival, 
supra note 166, at 340. 
2014] Sue and Settle: Demonizing the Environmental Citizen Suit 933 
do so after a trial.”265 The Chamber’s proposal would, therefore, reverse 
Supreme Court precedent and severely limit the authority of parties to 
enter into settlement agreements and consent decrees. 
Professors Gaba and Rossi raised concerns about limited judicial 
review of consent decrees in the past, but their concerns arose in the con-
text of substantive agreements, rather than scheduling agreements that 
were the focus of the Chamber’s report, and the reforms that they sug-
gested were more modest. For instance, Professor Gaba recognized that 
where parties challenge an agency regulation and the agency agrees—via 
consent decree or settlement agreement—to make specific substantive 
changes to a rule and issue a new notice of proposed rulemaking, the set-
tlement will often involve technical scientific or engineering details. 
However, a court reviewing the decree will generally lack the expertise 
to exercise independent judgment regarding those technical terms in the 
decree.266 To ensure that such consent decrees are in the public interest, 
Professor Gaba suggested that courts could require agencies to submit a 
written explanation for their change in position from the regulation that 
they initially adopted, which was challenged in the case.267 Professor 
Gaba also suggested that courts should exercise “hard look” review when 
reviewing challenges to regulations that were developed as a result of 
settlement agreements or consent decrees that included commitments by 
the agency to make specific substantive proposals.268 
Professor Rossi also argued that more stringent judicial oversight of 
consent decrees could provide greater protection for the public interest 
and persons who are not parties to the decrees.269 Specifically, he sug-
gested that courts should examine consent decrees at the time of approval 
under the same hard look standard that Professor Gaba suggested should 
apply to courts’ review of regulations that were adopted pursuant to sub-
stantive settlement agreements or consent decrees.270 Like Professor 
Gaba, Rossi focused his concerns on substantive agreements, rather than 
the scheduling agreements that were the primary focus of the Chamber’s 
report. Professor Rossi recognized, though, that there is no clear legal 
support for his proposal.271 
The Chamber’s proposal is more extreme than those offered by Pro-
fessors Rossi and Gaba and, to the extent that the proposed legislation 
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addresses a standard of review for judicial oversight of consent decrees 
and settlements, it adopts a more extreme position than that held by the 
Rossi or Gaba proposals: the proposed legislation requires courts to re-
view proposals to modify consent decrees de novo, without giving any 
deference to agencies.272 Like the other reforms suggested by the Cham-
ber and in the proposed legislation, the judicial reforms are more likely 
to obstruct, delay, or prevent settlement of lawsuits than to protect the 
public interest. 
4. Effects of Proposed Reforms 
When agencies are sued, especially in environmental cases, settle-
ments are the predominant manner of resolution.273 Many settlements are 
implemented through consent decrees because they provide distinct ad-
vantages over settlement agreements.274 As Professor Percival notes, 
“Consent decrees streamline enforcement of settlement agreements be-
cause they are subject to continuing oversight and interpretation by a 
single court. Their enforcement does not require the filing of an addition-
al lawsuit to establish the validity of the settlement contract, and they 
invoke ‘a flexible repertoire of enforcement measures.’”275 
Regardless of whether the agreements are implemented in consent 
decrees, settlements benefit agencies because they allow agencies to 
maintain control over their resources and priorities, and avoid “judicial 
interference with the remedial plan” that the agencies prefer to imple-
ment.276 By entering into settlements, an agency can avoid judgments 
that may have broad, adverse impacts on other programs administered by 
the agency.277 Further, an agency can preserve scarce resources and pre-
vent delay in the implementation of its regulatory programs by entering 
into settlements.278 Settlements also benefit society and courts by reduc-
ing the demands placed on courts and promoting quicker implementation 
of regulatory programs.279 In light of those benefits, there is an overrid-
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ing public interest in settling lawsuits against the government, especially 
when the litigation is likely to involve complex issues, as is the case in 
many environmental disputes.280 
The reforms proposed by the Chamber of Commerce and the re-
forms in the proposed congressional legislation will not limit the authori-
ty of environmental groups or any other persons to sue the EPA or other 
agencies when the agencies fail to take actions required by law or when 
the agencies violate the law. Citizens will continue to sue the government 
in those cases. 
However, the significant procedural limitations on consent decrees 
and settlement agreements in the reforms, such as those proposed by the 
Chamber and by Congress, will frustrate settlement of those lawsuits.281 
Instead of settling the lawsuits, the government (and therefore the public) 
will spend significant amounts of money and time defending those law-
suits in court.282 The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the re-
forms in the proposed legislation will cost almost $7 million over a four-
year period.283 To the extent that the government ultimately loses those 
lawsuits in court, which is almost a certainty for most of the failure-to-
act lawsuits, continued litigation will lead to an increased award of attor-
ney’s fees for the challengers and, thus, more financial liability for the 
government.284 Prolonged litigation, due to the limits on settlements, will 
also delay the implementation of regulations and agency actions that will 
provide benefits to human health and the environment.285 
In addition to the above-mentioned harms, the proposed reforms in-
terfere with judicial powers to manage litigation dockets and to resolve 
disputes equitably and efficiently, which is problematic in a litigious so-
ciety.286 The reforms threaten to impose all of those costs without provid-
ing significant benefits, as there is little evidence that there is any under-
lying problem to remedy. Aside from the allegations in its report, which 
have been shown here to be without merit, the Chamber provides no evi-
dence that the EPA or other agencies are entering into any collusive set-
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tlements of lawsuits or that agencies are entering into settlements in or-
der to circumvent proper rulemaking procedures.287 
D. A More Modest Solution 
Public awareness and participation are vital checks on the govern-
ment and facilitates rational, deliberative decision making. For decades, 
commentators have raised concerns that the public or persons who are 
not involved in lawsuits against the government may be adversely affect-
ed by the settlement of those lawsuits if the non-parties do not have some 
opportunity to participate in the settlement process.288 Accordingly, it 
would not seem to be overly burdensome to require government agencies 
to post a notice, on their websites and in the Federal Register, when a 
person files a notice of intent to sue. Persons who are not parties to the 
lawsuit but may be affected by the settlement of the suit could choose to 
intervene if they felt that intervention was necessary to protect their in-
terests.289 
The existing rules for intervention are sufficiently generous to al-
low persons whose interests are not adequately represented in the ongo-
ing litigation to intervene,290 so it is not necessary to modify those rules. 
Regarding the settlement process, while there may be situations where 
mediation or other alternative dispute resolution processes may be useful 
to resolve the litigation, the decision regarding whether to refer parties to 
mediation should be left to the courts, and it is not necessary to impose a 
general requirement for mediation or alternative dispute resolution in all 
cases against the federal government. 
Once the parties have reached an agreement in litigation involving 
the federal government, either as a consent decree or settlement agree-
ment, it would not seem overly burdensome to require notice and some 
opportunity for comment on the agreement before it is finalized if the 
agreement is likely to adversely affect persons who are not parties to the 
litigation. The requirement could be modeled on the provisions in the 
Clean Air Act, which require notice in the Federal Register and a thirty-
day comment period and do not require the development of a formal rec-
ord for the rulemaking period.291 
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Regarding judicial approval and supervision of the settlement 
agreement or consent decree, few limits should be placed on existing 
judicial authorities. Courts should continue to be allowed to approve 
agreements even though they include conditions that the court could not 
impose, as long as the agreements do not violate the law.292 The proposal 
in the congressional legislation that would require courts to ensure that 
scheduling agreements provide the government with enough time to 
comply with the APA and other laws and regulations regarding rulemak-
ing is not objectionable as long as courts accord agencies deference re-
garding their calculation of reasonable time frames. After all, the agency 
has an incentive to develop a workable schedule since they would likely 
be sued if they attempted to take the actions addressed in the scheduling 
agreements without complying with the APA or other rulemaking stat-
utes. 
There is little evidence that the government is entering into collu-
sive consent decrees and settlement agreements, as the Chamber of 
Commerce charges, and the proposals suggested by the Chamber and 
Congress seem to be designed to frustrate, rather than illuminate, settle-
ment. However, since “sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants,”293 
the modest changes outlined above to increase public participation and 
transparency in the development and review of consent decrees and set-
tlement agreements would seem beneficial in light of the prior concerns 
raised by commentators such as Professors Rossi and Gaba.294 
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